Idea
This claim assumes that the religious regime of truth does not easily accept pluralism, because it tends to present truth as singular and final. Thus doctrinal conflicts emerge within Islam, as well as between the monotheistic religions, when creed turns into the sole criterion of legitimacy. The problem here is not merely disagreement over opinions, but a structure of belief that refuses to coexist with difference.
Condensed Formulation
The religious regime of truth: rejects: pluralism
Its Place in the Book’s Argument
This statement forms an important part of the book’s argument about the limits of dialogue when it remains superficial. The text does not stop at calling for mutual understanding; it also points out that the internal structure of some religious discourses prevents plurality from the outset. This claim therefore becomes a basis for understanding why sermonizing discourse or polite rhetoric is not enough to address conflict.
Why It Matters
The importance of this claim lies in the fact that it reveals deep roots of religious conflict rather than merely its visible consequences. It also clarifies a central aspect of Arkoun’s thought: the need to confront the structure that produces exclusion, rather than relying only on an ethical call for tolerance.
Brief Witness
This argument confirms that the religious regime of truth tends to reject pluralism because it presents truth as singular and final. From here, doctrinal conflicts appear within Islam, as well as between the monotheistic religions, when creed becomes the sole criterion of legitimacy. The problem is not only difference of opinion, but a structure of belief that refuses coexistence.
Reading Questions
- How does the rejection of pluralism explain the persistence of doctrinal and religious conflicts?
- Why does the text see traditional dialogue as potentially limited in usefulness in this case?
Level of Documentation
High: the claim appears in a clear location in the book’s material.